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LAWYERS HAVE FREE SPEECH RIGHTS, TOO:
WHY GAG ORDERS ON TRIAL PARTICIPANTS
ARE ALMOST ALWAYS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Erwin Chemerinsky*
I. INTRODUCTION

Media coverage of trial proceedings is nothing new. There have been
a series of "trials of the century" over the last hundred years.' The O.J.
Simpson criminal trial received more media attention than any other legal
proceeding in American or world history. The Simpson case will likely
mean more media coverage of more court proceedings in the future
because it has shown that there is a large audience interested in the real life
drama of the courtroom. The Simpson case also focused attention, more
than ever before, on the issue of publicity and its effects on a fair trial.
As judges have struggled with the media in high profile cases, one
technique has become increasingly common: gag orders precluding
lawyers and parties from speaking with the press. In the civil suit against
Simpson, Judge Hiroshi Fujisaki imposed a broad order prohibiting the
attorneys and parties from discussing the case in public, even though Judge
Lance Ito had refused to impose such a gag order in the earlier criminal
prosecution. Similarly, in the Oklahoma City bombing case, United States
District Court Judge Richard Matsch imposed an order preventing the
lawyers from speaking with the media about the pending litigation.
These court orders undoubtedly are motivated by the laudable goal of
trying to ensure a fair trial. In recent years, a number of scholars have
urged courts to increase use of gag orders so as to uphold the constitutional
value of fair and impartial trial proceedings. 2 The Supreme Court's
* Legion Lex Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Southern California. I
want to thank Aleks Frimershstein and Chris Johnson for their excellent research assistance.
1. GERALD F. UELMEN, LESSONS FROM THE TRIAL: THE PEOPLE V. O.J. SIMPSON, 1-8

(1996).
2. See, e.g., Eileen A. Minnefor, Lookingfor Fair Trials in the Information Age: The Need
for More Stringent Gag Orders Against Trial Participants,30 U.S.F. L. REV. 95 (1995); Mark
R. Stabile, Free Press-FairTrial: Can They Be Reconciled in a Highly Publicized Criminal
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decision in Nebraska Press Ass n v. Stuart has virtually precluded gaI
orders on the press as a way of preventing prejudicial pretrial publicity.
Trial courts have thus responded in a manner not precluded by the
Supreme Court: gag orders on lawyers and parties. The restrictions on
lawyer speech are further justified by the claim that attorneys are officers
of the court
and thus are more subject to court-imposed limits to preserve a
5
fair trial.
I strongly disagree with this trend towards gagging trial participants'
speech and believe that such court orders are virtually always
unconstitutional. The imposition of these gag orders is based on several
assumptions that are, at the very least, unproven and more likely
untenable. First is the assumption that publicity jeopardizes a fair trial. In
one high profile case after another-the McMartin preschool case, the rape
trial of William Kennedy Smith, the two trials of the officers for beating
Rodney King, the trial of Damion Williams and Henry Watson for beating
Reginald Denny, the murder trials of the Menendez brothers, and the O.J.
Simpson prosecution-there was speculation that the extensive publicity
would make a conviction of the defendant a certainty. Yet, most of these
cases resulted in acquittals, thus raising serious questions as to whether
publicity hurts criminal defendants.
Moreover, even assuming the
prosecution has a "right" to a fair trial, there is no reason to believe that
publicity accounted for the outcomes.
Second, even if publicity is detrimental to a fair trial, there is the
assumption that statements by lawyers and parties cause or exacerbate the
harm. As the Simpson civil case demonstrates, gag orders on the attorneys
and parties do not decrease media coverage but merely limit the sources of
information. The assumption is that by limiting one source of information
a fairer trial would likely result.
Case?, 79 GEO. L.J. 337 (1990).
3. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
4. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 8-4 (1994)

(Nebraska Press has been treated as an almost complete bar to gag orders on the press); see id.
at n. 12 (collecting cases rejecting such prior restraints). One of the few cases in which a lower
court imposed a prior restraint was United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D. Fla.), aff'd
sub nom. In re Cable News Network, 917 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1990), where a federal district

court enjoined CNN from broadcasting tapes of conversations between deposed Panamian
dictator Manuel Noriega and his attorneys.

For a persuasive argument that the district court

erred in granting this prior restraint because the Nebraska Press requirements were not met, see
SMOLLA, supra, at 8-53. See also Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219 (6th
Cir. 1996) (holding unconstitutional a prior restraint on Business Week to prevent publication of
material that had been produced during discovery and was sealed pursuant to a court order).

5. See, e.g., Levine v. United States, 764 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1985); Stabile, supra note 2, at
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Indeed, if such gag orders have an effect, it likely is
counterproductive to the goal of fair judicial proceedings. Gag orders on
trial participants cause the media to rely on less accurate sources of
information. Instead of having statements on the record from the most
knowledgeable individuals, the attorneys and parties in a case, the media
must accept off-the-record statements or second- and third-hand accounts.
Furthermore, attorneys and parties might respond to inaccuracies in media
stories or in statements by others and thereby increase the chances of a fair
trial.
Third, even if it is accepted that pretrial publicity is prejudicial and
that gag orders on lawyers and parties make a positive difference, the
assumption is that these benefits outweigh the enormous burden on First
Amendment rights. The court orders are content-based restrictions on
speech and therefore subject to strict scrutiny. 6 Moreover, the court orders
are prior restraints on speech and the Supreme Court has declared that
"prior restraints on speech . . . are the most serious and least tolerable
infringement on First Amendment rights." 7 The Supreme Court frequently
has stated that "[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this8
Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."
Court orders preventing speech are classic forms of prior restraint. 9 Thus,
gag orders on lawyers and parties should be allowed only if no other
alternative would suffice. The Supreme Court has held that attorneys may
be disciplined for speech that poses a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding. The assumption underlying gag
orders is that such disciplinary proceedings are insufficient and that a prior
restraint is necessary.
Unless and until these three assumptions are justified, gag orders on
attorneys and parties should be regarded as unconstitutional. This Article
goes further than merely identifying the unproven assumptions underlying
gag orders; it also examines the appropriate constitutional standard to be
used in evaluating such court orders and explains why it is a standard that
virtually never will be met. Part II of this Article argues that strict scrutiny
is the test that must be met before a court can impose an order restricting
the speech of attorneys and parties. Section A of Part II identifies the
current uncertainty in the law regarding the standard for evaluating such
6. See infra text accompanying notes 57-82.
7. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
8. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (quoting Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
9. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
10. See Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
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gag orders."I Section B of Part II explains why gag orders on lawyers and
parties should be regarded as content-based prior restraints and thus
subject to strict scrutiny. Finally, Section C responds to the arguments for
a lower standard of review, especially to the claim that lawyers are officers
of the court and thus should be accorded less First Amendment protection.
Part III considers how strict scrutiny should be applied. Section A
argues that gag orders on lawyers and parties should be governed by the
same test that is used in evaluating prior restraints on the press to prevent
prejudicial pretrial publicity. In Nebraska Press, the Supreme Court
articulated a test for when gag orders may be placed on the press. The
same standard should be used in evaluating prior restraints on attorneys
and parties. Section B concludes by explaining why this test will virtually
never be met.
A fair trial is undoubtedly one of the Constitution's most important
guarantees, but so too are freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
The need to ensure a fair trial should not be a talismanic incantation that
justifies sacrificing First Amendment values. Gag orders on lawyers and
parties should be tolerated only if there is proof that a fair trial is unlikely
without such a prior restraint, that no other alternatives can succeed, and
that the gag order will significantly enhance the likelihood of a fair trial. It
is almost impossible to imagine a situation in which all of these
requirements will be satisfied.
II. WHY STRICT SCRUTINY MUST BE MET BEFORE GAG ORDERS
CAN BE IMPOSED ON ATTORNEYS AND PARTIES

A. The Uncertainty in the CurrentLaw
No Supreme Court case has addressed the constitutionality of gag
orders on lawyers and parties. As mentioned above, in Nebraska Press,
the Court considered the constitutionality of prior restraints on the press to
protect a fair trial. 13 The only mention in Nebraska Press of gag orders on
attorneys was a passing reference in a long list of alternatives to prior
restraints on the press. The Court recited many alternatives to gag orders
on the press, including changing venue, postponing the trial to allow public
attention to subside, probing interrogation of prospective jurors to screen
11. There is no Supreme Court case on point, and lower courts are split as to the applicable
standard.
12. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
13. Id.
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out those with fixed opinions as to guilt or innocence, providing clear
instructions to the jury as to what may be considered in reaching a verdict,
and sequestering jurors. 14 One item on this list of alternatives was the
possibility of orders limiting speech by attorneys. However, this last
alternative is merely dicta because Nebraska Press did not involve such a
gag order and the Court did not appraise its constitutionality.
The primary Supreme Court decision concerning attorney speech in
pending cases, Gentile v. State Bar,15 did not consider a prior restraint. In
Gentile, the Court held that attorney speech involving pending cases is
protected by the First Amendment, but that it can be punished if it poses a
substantialS16likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicatory
proceeding. Criminal defense attorney Dominic Gentile gave a press
conference in which he said that his client was an innocent "scapegoat"
who was the victim of "crooked cops."' 17 After the client was acquitted,
Gentile for violating the
Nevada brought, disciplinary
.. proceedings..against
18
Nevada had adopted a
state's code of professional responsibility.
provision based on the American Bar Association's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, which prohibits attorney speech that has a
"substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicatory
proceeding."
Gentile argued that an attorney should be subjected to discipline only
if there is a "clear and present danger" to the fair administration of
justice. 20 He contended that the "substantial likelihood" test did not
sufficiently protect speech. 2 1 The Supreme Court, in a five-four decision,
rejected this argument and upheld Nevada's ethics rule. The Court
explained that attorneys are officers of the Court and thus are more subject
to regulation of their speech than others. 22 The Court also noted that
speech by attorneys could pose a greater risk to the fair administration of
23
justice. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated: "Because
lawyers have special access to information through discovery and client
communications, their extrajudicial statements pose a threat to the fairness

at 563-64.
14. Id.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
Id.
Id. at 1034.
Id. at 1033.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6(a) (1995).

20. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1069.
21. Id.at n.4.

22. Id. at 1031.
23. Id.
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of a pending proceeding
•
•
• since
,,24 lawyers' statements are likely to be received
The Court thus concluded: "We agree with
authoritative.
as especially
the majority of the States that the 'substantial likelihood of material
prejudice' standard constitutes a constitutionally permissible balance
between the First Amendment rights of attorneys in pending cases and the
However, Gentile only involved the
State's interest in fair trials.'
standard for after-the-fact punishment on lawyer speech, not prior
restraints.
In the absence of guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts
have adopted several different standards in determining when gag orders
on lawyers and parties are constitutionally permissible. For example,
some courts have said that such gag orders
....are allowable so long as26they
seem reasonably related to achieving a fair trial. In In re Russell, the
court of appeals approved a district court gag order on potential witnesses
in a criminal case against alleged members of the Ku Klux Klan. The
defendants were implicated in the shooting deaths of five individuals and
the judge felt that the "proscription of certain extrajudicial
communications by prospective witnesses was necessary in order to
protect the rights of the defendants to a fair trial 'based solely on
admissible evidence."' '2 7 The court of appeals approved the gag order
because of the "reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial
will prevent a fair trial." 28 The court concluded that "[t]he tremendous
publicity attending this trial, the potentially inflammatory and highly
prejudicial statements that could reasonably be expected from petitioners.
. and the relative ineffectiveness of the considered alternatives, dictated
the 'strong measure' of suppressing the speech of potential witnesses to
ensure a fair trial."2 9
Likewise, the Tenth Circuit has approved gag orders on trial
participants based on this relaxed reasonable likelihood standard. In

24. Id. at 1074.

25. Id. at 1075. However, the Court also found that a particular provision in the Nevada
rule was unconstitutional. The Court voted five-four to uphold the substantial likelihood test.
Justice O'Connor, who was part of the majority on that issue, joined with the dissenters to
comprise a majority to declare that the "safe harbor" provisions of the law were impermissibly
vague. For example, one exception said that lawyers could make statements about the nature of
the defense. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court on this issue, found that this safe harbor
provision did not provide sufficient guidance as to what speech was allowed and what was
protected.
26. 726 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1984).
27. Id. at 1009.
28. Id. at 1010.
29. Id.
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United States v. Tijernia,30 the court of appeals held that a gag order on
trial participants is constitutional if there is "a 'reasonable likelihood' of
prejudicial news which would make difficult the impaneling of an
impartial jury and tend to prevent a fair trial." 31 The district court had
issued an order that prohibited the attorneys, defendants and witnesses
from:
mak[ing] or issu[ing] any public statement, written or oral,
either at a public meeting or occasion or for public reporting or
dissemination in any fashion regarding the juror or jurors in this
case, prospective or selected, the merits of the case, the
evidence, actual or anticipated, the witnesses or the rulings of
32
the Court.
The court of appeals upheld this order and expressly rejected use of the
clear and present danger test. The court stated that the reasonable
33
likelihood standard was appropriate in order to ensure a fair trial.
At the opposite end of the continuum, some courts of appeals have
articulated strict scrutiny as the appropriate test for gag orders on trial
participants. For instance, in CBS v. Young, 34 the Sixth Circuit stated that
such a court order "must be subjected ... to the closest scrutiny." 35 In the
consolidated legal proceedings arising from the killing of students by the
National Guard during the demonstration at Kent State University on May
4, 1970, the district court entered a gag order that prohibited all parties to
the litigation, as well as their relatives, friends, and associates, from
discussing "in any manner whatsoever these cases with the news media or
the public." 36 The court of appeals found that the order was an "extreme
37
example of a prior restraint upon freedom of speech and expression."
The court explained that the gag order sealed the lips of "all parties
concerned with this litigation, whether plaintiffs or defendants, their
relatives, close friends, and associates ... from discussing in any manner
38
whatsoever these cases with members of the news media or the public."
In addition to expressing concern for the First Amendment rights of these
individuals, the court also explained that the order impaired the First
30. 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir. 1969).

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.at 666.
Id. at 667.
Id. at 666.
522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 238.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 236.
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Amendment right of the press to gather information. 39 The court thus
concluded that to meet judicial approval, statements "must pose a clear and
present danger, or a serious and imminent threat to a competing protected
interest" and "must be narrowly drawn and cannot be upheld if reasonable
alternatives40 are available having a lesser impact on First Amendment
freedoms."
The Sixth Circuit reaffirmed this test in United States v. Ford.41 In
this highly publicized case involving mail and bank fraud charges against
United States Congressmember Harold Ford of Tennessee, the district
court entered an order that prohibited Ford from making any "extrajudicial
statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by
means of public communication." 42 The court stated that the Nebraska
Press test, which concerns gag orders on the press, should apply to gag
orders on trial participants. The court explained that "any restrictive order
involving a prior restraint upon First Amendment freedoms is
presumptively void and may be upheld only on the basis of a clear
showing that an exercise of First Amendment rights will interfere with the
rights of the parties to a fair trial."'43 In order to validate such a prior
restraint against speech, the speech must pose a "'serious and imminent
threat' of a specific nature, the remedy for which can be narrowly tailored
in an injunctive order." 44 The court also noted that there must be a finding
sequestration, or change of
that "less burdensome alternatives of voir dire,
45
venue" will not suffice to protect a fair trial.
The Second Circuit applies a similar test when gag orders are
challenged by trial participants. 46 The court in United States v. Salameh4 7
considered a gag order in the prosecutions arising from the bombing of the
World Trade Center in New York City. To avoid the feared prejudicial
effects of expected extensive pretrial publicity, the trial court judge issued

39. Id. at 239 (citation omitted).
40. CBS, 552 F.2d at 238.
41. 830 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1987).
42. Id. at 597.
43. Id. at 599 (quoting CBS v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 1975)).
44. Id. at 600.
45. Id.
46. Interestingly, the Second Circuit has ruled that the less protective reasonable likelihood
test should be applied when the challenge to a gag order is brought by the media rather than by

an individual covered by the court's order. See In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.
1988).
47. 992 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1993).
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parties to the action from publicly
an order barring counsel for all
48
case.
the
of
aspect
any
discussing
The court of appeals recognized that the gag order was a prior
restraint and stated that three conditions had to be met for such an order to
be constitutional. First, "the limitations on attorney speech should be no
broader than necessary to protect the integrity of the judicial system and
the defendant's right to a fair trial." 49 Second, the trial court must explore
"whether other available remedies would effectively mitigate the
to all
prejudicial publicity." 5 Third, the trial court must give proper notice
51
heard.
be
to
opportunity
the
party
each
give
and
parties restrained
The Ninth Circuit has adopted an approach similar to the one
articulated by the Second Circuit. In Levine v. United States,52 the court of
appeals upheld a gag order that the trial court had imposed on lawyers and
the defendant in the Richard Miller spying case. The court found that a
prior restraint on speech by parties may be upheld only if three
requirements are met. First, the activity restrained must pose a clear and
present danger or a serious and imminent threat to a protected competing
interest.5 3 Second, the order must be narrowl' drawn.5 4 Finally, less
However, the Ninth
restrictive alternatives must not be available.
Circuit, like the Second Circuit, uses a less protective test if the challenge
to the gag order is brought 56by the press rather than by the participants
covered by the court's order.
Thus, the law is unsettled as to when gag orders on trial participants
are constitutional. This uncertainty is likely to remain until the Supreme
Court addresses the issue and articulates a standard.
B. Strict Scrutiny as the Appropriate Test

Gag orders on lawyers and parties are unquestionably content-based
restrictions on speech. The Supreme Court has declared that "[c]ontentbased regulations are presumptively invalid." 57 In Turner Broadcasting
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 446.
Id. at 447 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
764 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 595 (citation omitted).

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Radio & Television News Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 781 F.2d 1443, 1447
(9th Cir. 1986).
57. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
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System v. Federal Communication Commission,58 the Court held that the
general rule is that content-based restrictions on speech must meet strict
scrutiny, while content-neutral regulations need only meet intermediate
scrutiny. 59 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, explained "[g]overnment action that stifles speech on account of its message, or that requires
the utterance of a particular message favored by the Government,
contravenes this essential [First Amendment] right."6 0 Justice Kennedy
noted: "For these reasons, the First Amendment, subject only to narrow
and well-understood exceptions, does not countenance governmental
61
control over the content of messages expressed by private individuals."
Thus, the Court endorsed a two-tier system of review using "the most
exacting scrutiny to regulat[e] [burdens] that suppress, disadvantage, or
impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content . . . . In
contrast, regulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are subject
to an intermediate level of scrutiny." 62
Court issued gag orders are content-based because their application
depends entirely on the topic of the speech. Further, restrictions are
imposed only on the ability of the trial participants to speak about the
pending case. Attorneys and witnesses are free to speak about any other
subject except the litigation. It is firmly established that content-based
restrictions on expression must meet strict scrutiny.
There is no doubt that a restriction on the ability of individuals to
discuss specific topics is a content-based restriction on speech. For
example, in Carey v. Brown,63 Chicago adopted an ordinance prohibiting
except labor picketing connected
all picketing ain residential neighborhoods
64
The Supreme Court held this regulation
to a place of employment.
unconstitutional. The Court explained the law imposed an impermissible
content-based restriction because it allowed speech about the subject of
labor, yet prohibited all other forms. 65 Likewise, court orders on trial
participants restrict their ability to speak about the subject matter of the
case, but not otherwise.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
Id. at 2459.
Id. at 2458.
Id.
Id. at 2459.
447 U.S. 455 (1980).
Id. at 457.
Id.
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Simon & Schuster v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims
Board66 represents another illustration of the unconstitutionality of
content-based restrictions on speech, one more closely related to limits on
trial participants. 67 In Simon & Schuster, the Court declared unconstitutional a state law that prevented an accused or convicted criminal from
profiting from selling the story of his or her crime to any media. 68 The socalled "Son of Sam" law placed any funds received from works describing
the crime into an escrow account that was used for restitution to victims of
the crime and for paying the criminal's other creditors.
The New York law did not prohibit any speech; it only prevented
individuals from keeping profits from selling the tales of their criminal
activity. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found the law violated the First
Amendment. The Supreme Court stressed that the state law was content
based: "[i]t singles out income derived from expressive activity for a
burden the State places on no other income, and it is directed only at works
with a specified content." 69 The Court applied strict scrutiny and
concluded that although compensating crime victims was a compelling
interest, the state could achieve its goal through less restrictive means.
Thus, strict scrutiny is the appropriate test in evaluating restrictions
on the ability of trial participants to discuss a pending case because court
orders are content-based limitations on expression. Moreover, the gag
orders merit strict scrutiny because they are prior restraints on speech. The
Supreme Court has stated that "prior restraints on speech and publication
are the most serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights." 70 The First Amendment was, in part, a reaction against the
licensing requirements for publication that had existed in England. This
legacy prompted Blackstone to declare that "[t]he liberty of the press is
indeed essential to the nature of a free state: but this consists in laying no
previous restraints upon publication, and not in freedom from censure for
criminal matter when published." 7 1 Although it is clear that "the
prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
1966).

502 U.S. 105 (1991).
Id. at 115.
Id.
Id. at 116.
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 151-52 (London, Dawsons of Pall Mall
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previous restraints," 72 there is no doubt that prior restraints are regarded as
a particularly undesirable way of regulating speech.
Prior restraints are regarded as particularly undesirable because they
prevent speech from ever occurring.
The Court in Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad73 explained that "[b]ehind the distinction is a
theory deeply etched in our law: a free society prefers to punish the few
who abuse rights of speech
break the law than to throttle them
,,74after they
..
and all others beforehand.
Inevitably, prior restraints could be imposed
based on predictions of danger that would not actually materialize and thus
would not be the basis for subsequent punishments.75 Moreover, prior
restraints are worse than other forms of regulating speech because of the
collateral bar rule: a person violating an unconstitutional law may not be
punished, but a person violating an unconstitutional prior restraint
generally may be punished. Specifically, the collateral bar rule provides
that "a court order must be obeyed until it is set aside, and that persons
subject to the order who disobey it may not defend against the ensuring
charge of criminal contempt
on the ground that the order was erroneous or
76
even unconstitutional."
There is no doubt that court orders limiting speech are a classic form
of prior restraint. In Alexander v. United States, 7 the Court stated that
"[t]he term prior restraint is used 'to describe administrative and judicial
orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the
time that such communication are to occur."' 78 In cases such as Near v.
Minnesota,79 New York Times v. United States, and NebraskaPress Ass 'n
v. Stuart, the Court unequivocally held that court orders prohibiting
speech are prior restraints and must meet the highest level of scrutiny.
Thus, gag orders on trial participants should meet strict scrutiny
because they are both content-based restrictions on expression and prior

72. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919).
73. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
74. Id. at 559.
75. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of PriorRestraint: The Central Linkage, 66
MINN. L. REv. II, 49-54 (1982).

76. Stephen Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REv. 539, 552 (1977); see
also Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (applying and articulating the
collateral bar rule).
77. 509 U.S. 544 (1993).
78. Id. at 550 (quoting M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.03 p. 4-14
(1984)).

79. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
80. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
81. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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restraints on speech. Gag orders also impair freedom of the press and the
public's ability to be fully informed. Although the Supreme Court
generally has not protected a First Amendment right for the press to gather
information, it has observed that "without some protection for seeking out
the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." 82 Gag orders on trial
participants limit the ability of the media to obtain accurate information
and thus to inform the public about pending court proceedings.
For all of these reasons, court orders limiting speech of attorneys and
parties should be allowed only if strict scrutiny is met. Content-based
prior restraints are always subjected to the most exacting judicial review
and are permissible only under the most limited and compelling
circumstances.
C. Is Less Than Strict Scrutiny Warranted
Because Attorneys Are Officers of the Court?
The primary argument for applying less than strict scrutiny is that
attorneys are officers of the court and, therefore, are entitled to less free
speech protection than others in society. Mark Stabile has argued, for
example, that gag orders are "particularly justified when applied to
lawyers and court personnel. ' 83 He argues that officers of the court have a
fiduciary responsibility not to prejudice fair trials because they have
special access to information and a professional responsibility not to
thwart a fair judicial process. 84 Stabile finds support for his view in the
Supreme Court's statement in Sheppard v. Maxwell 85 that "[c]ollaboration
between counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a
criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and
86
worthy of disciplinary measures."
The argument that gag orders on lawyers should receive less than
strict scrutiny also has support in the language of some Supreme Court
opinions. For instance, Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion in
Nebraska Press said that "as officers of the court, court personnel and
attorneys have a fiduciary responsibility not to engage in public debate that
will redound to the detriment of the accused or that will obstruct the fair
administration of justice." 8 7 Likewise, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
Stabile, supra note 2, at 346.
Id.
384 U.S. 333 (1966).
Id. at 363.
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 601 n.27 (1976) (Brennan,

J.,
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Gentile that "[t]he State has a substantial interest in preventing officers of
the court, such as lawyers, from imposing such costs [referring to the
of pretrial publicity] on the judicial system and on the
adverse effects
88
litigants."
However, there are many serious problems with the argument that
less than strict scrutiny is required for gag orders on trial participants
because attorneys are officers of the court. First, this would justify a lower
level of scrutiny for gag orders on attorneys, but not on parties or
witnesses because in no sense are they officers of the court.8 9
Second, the descriptive statement that attorneys are officers of the
court does not justify the normative conclusion that a lesser standard of
constitutional review should be used in reviewing restrictions on attorney
speech. Even accepting the characterization that lawyers are officers of
the court, that says nothing about the duties that are attendant to this role.
The assumption that lawyers have a duty to refrain from publicity that may
prejudice a jury does not explain why a lower level of scrutiny is
appropriate in evaluating content-based prior restraints. At best, it may
explain the standard adopted by the Court in Gentile for after-the-fact
punishments against lawyers for speech that has a substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding.
In other words, the descriptive role of attorneys in a judicial system
does not resolve the normative constitutional question as to when prior
restraints on speech should be allowed. In fact, Justice Kennedy argued
that the unique position of lawyers, if anything, justifies more protection
for their speech. In Gentile, Justice Kennedy wrote:
To the extent the press and public rely upon attorneys for
information because attorneys are well informed, this may
prove the value to the public of speech by members of the bar.
If the dangers of their speech arise from its persuasiveness,
from their ability to explain judicial proceedings, or from the
likelihood the speech will be believed, these are not the sort of
dangers that can validate restrictions. The First Amendment

concurring).
88. Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991).
89. An argument may be made that parties waive some of their speech rights by consenting
to the court's jurisdiction. This argument, however, can only be applied to those who invoke the
court's jurisdiction: plaintiffs in civil cases and the government as prosecutor in criminal cases.
Defendants are involuntarily present and thus cannot be said to consent to a restriction on their
speech. Moreover, conditioning access to the courts on relinquishing First Amendment
freedoms is an impermissible unconstitutional condition. The unconstitutional conditions
doctrine is discussed in text accompanying notes 91-97.

19971

LAWYERS HAVE FREE SPEECHRIGHTS, TOO

does not permit suppression
of speech because of its power to
90
assent.
command
Third, applying a lower level of scrutiny to prior restraints against
attorneys would be an impermissible unconstitutional condition on bar
membership.
Lawyers would be forced to relinquish their First
Amendment rights in exchange for their ticket to practice law. 9 1 The
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is the principle that the government
cannot condition a benefit on the requirement that a person forego a
constitutional right. The central idea is that the "government may not deny
a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right."
Speiser v. Randall9 3 is a classic example of the application of the
unconstitutional condition doctrine. A California law provided that in
order to receive a veterans' property tax exemption, the individual had to
sign a declaration disavowing a belief in overthrowing the United States
government by force or violence. 94 The Court said that "[t]o deny an
exemption to claimants who engage5 in certain forms of speech is in effect
to penalize them for such speech.'"
Conditioning a benefit on a requirement that individuals give up their
First Amendment rights pressures individuals to forego constitutionally
protected speech. The Speiser Court explained that the condition "will
have the effect of coercing the claimants to refrain from the proscribed
speech." 96
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine prevents the
government from penalizing those who exercise their constitutional rights
97 In Perry v.
by withholding
•
98 a benefit that otherwise would be available.
Sindermann, the Court, in explaining that the government could not deny
employment to a person for exercising First Amendment rights, declared:
"For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his
90. 501 U.S. at 1056-57.
91. See Michael E. Swartz, Trial Restrictions: Gagging First Amendment Rights, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1411, 1426-27 (1990) (arguing that the officer of the court rationale
constitutes an impermissible unconstitutional condition).
92. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983) (quoting Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
93. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
94. Id. at 515.
95. Id. at 518.
96. Id. at 519.
97. There is large and rich literature on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. See, e.g.,
Richard Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of
Consent, 102 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1988); Seth Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of
Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984); Kathleen Sullivan,
UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1413 (1989).
98. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those
freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the
government to 'produce a result which [it] could not command
directly."' 99
Applying a lower level of scrutiny to content-based prior restraints on
attorney speech, as compared with the standard applied to content-based
prior restraints on everyone else's speech, would create an unconstitutional
condition on the practice of law. Attorneys would be required to
relinquish their speech rights in exchange for the ability to practice law.
In sum, strict scrutiny should be applied to gag orders on all trial
participants, just as strict scrutiny is applied to all content-based prior
restraints. Prior restraints on speech by lawyers, parties, and witnesses
should be upheld only if the most exacting scrutiny is met.
III. APPLYING STRICT SCRUTINY:
WHY GAG ORDERS ARE ALMOST ALWAYS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

A. The Nebraska Press Test
In considering gag orders on the press to prevent prejudicial pretrial
publicity, the Supreme Court was not content to announce strict scrutiny as
the standard. The Court instead articulated a more specific test that must
be met in order for such prior restraints to be permissible. In Nebraska
Press, the Supreme Court ruled that the strong presumption against prior
restraints means that such gag orders on the press will be allowed only if a
three-part test is met.1°° Nebraska Press involved a defendant who was
tried for committing six murders in a small town in Nebraska. The trial
court issued an injunction restraining the media from publishing or
broadcasting accounts of confessions
or admissions made by the accused
10 1
or facts strongly implicating him.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court began by reviewing the
historical conflict between a free press and ensuring a fair trial.' ° 2 The
Court determined that these rights cannot be ranked in relationship to one
another. 103 Both rights are fundamental, and, as the Court articulated, one

99. Id. at 597 (citation omitted).
100. 427 U.S. 539 (1976); see infra text accompanying notes 101-112.
101. 427 U.S. at 540.
102. Id. at 551-56.
103. See generally id.
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cannot be achieved at the expense of the other. 10 4 The Court concluded
that there was a very strong presumption against court orders preventing
pretrial publicity as a way to protect a fair trial because the "barriers to
prior restraint [must] remain high."' 10 5
In reviewing the case before the Court, Chief Justice Burger indicated
three requirements that had to be met to justify a gag order on the press to
First, there has to be a showing
protect a defendant's right to a fair trial.
of extensive publicity without a prior restraint that will jeopardize the
ability to select a fair and impartial jury. 10 7 The Court found that this
requirement was met in the case. Chief Justice Burger said that "the trial
judge was justified in concluding that there would be intense and pervasive
pretrial publicity ... [and] [h]e could also reasonably conclude, based on
common human experience, that publicity might impair the defendant's
right to a fair trial."
Second, to justify a prior restraint, it must be
determined which "measures short of an order restraining all publication
would [not] have insured the defendant a fair trial."' 1 9 The Court provided
a long list of alternatives to gag orders on the press, including changing
venue, postponing the trial to allow public attention to subside, probing
interrogation of prospective jurors "to screen out those with fixed opinions
as to guilt or innocence,"H1 providing clear instructions to the jury as to
what may be considered in reaching a verdict, and sequestering jurors.
The Court found that in Nebraska Press there was not a finding that these
alternatives would have been insufficient to protect the defendant's right to
a fair trial.' '
Finally, even if the first two requirements are met, a prior restraint is
permissible only if it is determined that the restraint would be a workable
and effective method of securing a fair trial. 112 For example, there is a
significant likelihood that media outlets outside the scope of the court's
order will cover the case and that this will reach prospective jurors.
The Nebraska Press standard also should be applied to gag orders on
speech by trial participants. As discussed in Part II, content-based prior
restraints on speech by attorneys and witnesses should be required to meet

104. Id.

105. Id. at 561.
106. Id., at 562-63.
107. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 562-63.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 563.
110. Id. at 564.
111. id.
112. Id. at 565.
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the most strict standard of review, which is used for gag orders on the
press. The same three-part test is appropriate when considering gag orders
on trial participants.
B. Applying Nebraska Press to Gag Orderson Trial Participants
In Nebraska Press, the Court indicated that it was not creating an
absolute ban on prior restraints to protect a defendant's right to a fair
trial, 113 but from a practical perspective, the Court did just that.'
It is
difficult to imagine a case in which all three requirements can be met.
Even assuming that extensive pretrial publicity threatens a defendant's
right to a fair trial, it is difficult to see how a court could conclude that all
alternatives to a gag order would fail or that a prior restraint would be
successful in keeping prospective jurors from receiving information.
Indeed, as Professor Smolla observed, "[l]ower courts have treated
Nebraska Press as tantamount to an absolute prohibition on such prior
restraints, consistently refusing
to permit orders limiting press coverage of
5
judicial proceedings.""
The Supreme Court has never approved a prior restraint to protect a
defendant's right to a fair trial since Nebraska Press. For example, in
Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court,1 6 the Court declared
unconstitutional a judge's order enjoining the news media from publishing,
broadcasting, or disseminating the name or picture of an eleven-year-old
boy accused of murder. In a brief per curiam opinion, the Court said that
the media had lawfully obtained the information and thus there could be no
injunction to prevent its truthful reporting.117
For the same reasons, gag orders on trial participants virtually always
should be unacceptable and deemed unconstitutional. First, it is extremely
unlikely that it ever can be shown that lawyers' statements will pose a
serious risk to a fair trial. There is little evidence that pretrial publicity
actually jeopardizes fair trials and even less that attorney speech endangers

113. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 570.
114. It should be noted that Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall took the position that
prior restraints never could be justified to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. at 572
(Brennan, J., concurring). Justice White expressed "grave doubt" that such a prior restraint ever
would be justified. Id. at 570 (White, J., concurring).
115. SMOLLA, supra note 4, at 8-4; see id. at 8-5 n.4 (collecting cases rejecting such prior
restraints); see also sources cited and discussion supra note 4.
116. 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
117. Id. at 310-11. The case is consistent with a body of decisions holding that the
government may not create liability for the invasion of privacy for the truthful reporting of
information lawfully obtained from government records.
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fair judicial proceedings. Justice Kennedy observed that "[o]nly the
occasional case presents a danger of prejudice from pretrial publicity.
Empirical research suggests that in the few instances when jurors have
been exposed to extensive and prejudicial publicity, they are able to
1 18
disregard it and base their verdict upon the evidence presented in court."
Although empirical studies of various sorts have been attempted in
measuring the impact of publicity on juries, it likely will never be possible
to prove that media coverage prevents a fair trial. I It is impossible to try
the same case before two juries, one that has been exposed to publicity and
one that has been totally shielded. Thus, it is difficult to see how it ever
can be demonstrated that attorney speech in a particular case will threaten
a fair trial.
The experience of recent high profile cases belies the conclusion that
the extensive publicity makes an acquittal more difficult for the defense.
In many recent cases that received extensive publicity, defendants were
acquitted despite predictions that media coverage would prejudice the
jurors against the defendant. For instance, there was pretrial publicity in
the McMartin preschool case, the William Kennedy Smith rape trial, and
the O.J. Simpson prosecution. In all of these cases, juries acquitted the
defendants. It cannot be assumed that publicity precludes convictions.
The prosecutions of Oliver North, Stacey Koon and Lawrence Powell for
beating Rodney King, and the Menendez brothers all ended in convictions
despite extensive media coverage. The cases might be seen as indicating
that juries decide based on what occurs at the trial and not what is reported
in the press. At a minimum, the cases show the difficulty in drawing any
conclusions about the effects of pretrial publicity on the outcome of cases.
I have three main disagreements with commentators and judges who
endorse gag orders on trial participants. First, I do not share their
perception that publicity is likely to endanger a fair trial. Eileen A.
Minnefor, for instance, argues for gag orders by concluding: "[T]he
potential harm from a gag order's temporary limit on trial participants'
free speech rights is much less serious than the immediate injury resulting
from the denial of a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial, which may
lead to an unwarranted deprivation of the defendant's liberty or even his or

118. Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1054 (1991).
119. See, e.g., Robert E. Dreschel, Judges' Perceptions of Fair Trial-FreePress Issue, 62
JOURNALISM Q. 388 (1985); Thomas E. Eimermann & Rita James Simon, Newspaper Coverage
of Crimes and Trials: Another Empirical Look at the Free Press-Fair Trial Controversy, 47
JOLRNALISM Q. 142 (1970); Norbert L. Kerr, The Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Jurors, 78
JUDICATURE 120 (1994).
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her death." 120 The unsupported assumption in this statement is that
lawyers' statements pose a risk of denying a criminal defendant's right to a
fair trial. First Amendment rights should not be compromised based on
such conjecture.
Second, under the Nebraska Press test, to justify a prior restraint, it
must be determined that no alternatives short of the gag order will succeed
in providing a fair trial. The Court has recognized that there are countless
alternatives to gag orders on the press, including changing venue,
postponing the trial to allow public attention to subside, probing
interrogation of prospective jurors, providing clear instructions to the jury
as to what may be considered in reaching a verdict, and sequestering
jurors. It is difficult to imagine the situation where all of these alternatives
to the gag order will be inadequate.
Third, even if there is a showing of substantial likelihood of prejudice
without a gag order and even if it is demonstrated that no alternative will
suffice, a prior restraint is permissible only if it is a workable and effective
method of securing a fair trial. Initially, it must be questioned whether gag
orders are enforceable. The reality is that leaks seem inevitable and there
will be no way to identify the source of statements, especially in states that
have reporter shield laws that protect confidential sources for the press.
More importantly, if there is such extensive publicity as to warrant a
gag order, it is questionable whether the additional statements by the
lawyer would make any difference. For example, in the civil suit against
O.J. Simpson, after all that has been said and written about the case, it is
unthinkable that anything new could be said by the lawyers that would
jeopardize a fair trial. In fact, in a case receiving extensive media
coverage, a gag order on lawyers might be counterproductive in that it
deprives the press of an accurate source of information.
IV. CONCLUSION

Gag orders on lawyers and parties are virtually always
unconstitutional and thus should not be imposed. Many, including some
trial judges, have uncritically assumed that increased media coverage of
trial proceedings is an undesirable threat to fair trials. The Supreme Court
has limited the tools available to trial courts in controlling publicity. The
press cannot be excluded from court proceedings 12 1 and gag orders on the
press are virtually always unconstitutional. Therefore, judges seeking to

120. Minnefor, supra note 2, at 139-40.
121. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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exercise control have relied on a tool not yet precluded by the Supreme
Court: gag orders on lawyers and witnesses.
Courts imposing such prior restraints are guided by one of the noblest
of constitutional objectives: preserving the constitutional right to a fair
trial. But these orders sacrifice equally important constitutional values,
freedom of speech and of the press, without any indication that such
restrictions are necessary. In this Article, I have argued that strict scrutiny
is the appropriate standard for evaluating gag orders on trial participants
and that this standard virtually never will be met.
Twenty years of experience with the Nebraska Press test yields no
evidence that the prohibition of gag orders on the press has compromised
fair trials. Limiting gag orders on lawyers and parties will pose no greater
danger.

332

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17

